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Science and Values: The Role of the Public in Priority Setting

ABSTRACT

In this essay I argue that in order to achieve scientific activity which produces relevant results, the broader community needs to participate in the setting of science policies. The problem of research priorities is put into the context of modern science, which emphasizes increased involvement of the public. Arguments of Utility vs Truth regularly come into play in this discussion, but in general, it was found that the strict delimitation of these two categories is purely theoretical as all scientific endeavours impact society in some way. Finally, the analysis of political and authoritative powers on scientific communities leads to the conclusion that scientists are, like any other agent, susceptible to external influences. Then, I conclude that the exclusion of public voices in priority setting is nothing but a form of favoritism towards one group over others and it should be overcome with the goal of a more morally sound process.

I. Introduction

Science is a social activity that is ever changing to accommodate the culture, beliefs and priorities of the time. Throughout the years, the interplay between the scientific process and society has led to questions about the participation of the public in the decision making of scientific issues. Some have framed this as the “problem of extension” (Collins & Evans, 2002), where the extent at which public opinion should be factored in science policy remains unclear. Since the scientific revolution and even more so recently, science has received huge amounts of funding and interest both from governments and from large private organizations. It seems that, now more than ever, the areas of science that get to be developed and expanded are the areas that have received more money or have been prioritized (Brooks, 1978). Because of this, it is valid to be concerned about the impact that wrong choices of projects or research institutions to fund could have on general scientific progress.

In this essay I argue that in order to achieve scientific activity which produces relevant and morally sound results, the broader community needs to participate in goal setting and in the creation of science policies. I also discuss some of the points brought up by people who oppose this participation in the search of a truth-driven science that is autonomous from societal influences. Even though those points are found to be compelling, I argue they should be posed as limitations to the extent and the manner of this involvement and not as hard barriers between the formal scientific community and the broader community.

II. Citizen Science and The Problem of Research Priorities

It is easier to dissociate science from human life in fields such as astrophysics and nanotechnology, but when discussing bio-medics or psychology, the very intent of those sciences is to better the lives of humans. It is in those cases where the question of research priorities becomes clear, as the outcomes as well as the processes are linked to strong ethical concerns as well as direct social and personal impacts. We can ask whether social participation is more required in some areas than in others and if so, how can we determine the extent to which it should happen in each field? The article Regulating Scientific Research: Should Scientists Be Left Alone? Discusses how the degree of impact of the decisions made in the field of biomedicine is so large that they require consensus “by a diverse group of stakeholders, including scientists, community members, policymakers, and ethicists” (Intemann & de Melo-Martin, 2007). Then why should we not consider the effect of launching thousands of satellites to improve network connection on the development of amateur and ground based astronomy research? (Witze, 2020) In general, the benefits of funding one area over another cannot be directly compared and exactly quantified, as the relationship between the results and the public is very complex. Because of this subjectivity, it becomes unreasonable to restrict the groups who can participate in decision making based only on their direct involvement in the topic rather than on the potential impacts each scientific development can have for them.

The process of normal science, as described in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is a consensus of a community on solutions, approaches and priorities that act as the base of their scientific activities (Kuhn, 1970). From this definition of daily science activity, the relation between the community and the scientific process is very clear, and this awareness has made initiatives such as community-engaged research and citizen science very popular. These are relatively new methods of conducting research that focus on collection of data and have a high involvement of non-specialists and amateur members of the general public (Elliott & Rosenberg, 2019). Authors such as Elliott and Rosenberg have characterized the drive for more practical concerns as a main reason for the rise of these movements. In addition to direct participation, Oftedal argues for the importance of external influences and contributions to determining which areas of science or projects to allocate resources towards (Oftedal, 2014). Specifically, he defends a version of science that focuses on “increased involvement and reflexivity in research processes to foster science and technology that better answers the needs of society”.

Some contemporary philosophers of science have identified the evolution of science into a post-truth era, where not even citizen science is enough to maintain the public’s engagement and support in scientific endeavours. Peters and Besley examined instances of built mistrust between the general civilian and the formal scientific community and emphasized that in the future of science, extended peer review and collaboration of multiple agents will likely be crucial (Peters & Besley, 2019). They claim that “citizens need to have both ‘voice’ and agency in science matters” in order to decrease the perceived gap between experts and the common population, which would reduce the mistrust cycle being now perpetuated. The alliance between the public and the narrower definition of the scientific community also comes from encouraging scientific literacy, allowing for a more informed consumption of science news and communication. The Problem of Research Priorities (Brooks, 1978) explores the tensions between this newly defined scientific era of questioning and the methods installed at the moment for the setting of science policies. According to Brooks, there is nothing intrinsically embedded in the process of science that can rationally determine which area or project deserves funding over another. As a consequence, decisions are subjective and highly dependent on external factors, for which it is essential to discuss the significance of public participation in this process.

III. External Powers in the Debate of Truth vs Utility

Opponents of this democratization and expansion of the scientific process present arguments extending from the enduring debate of Truth vs Utility. Even if most philosophers did agree that social participation in science could lead to results more relevant to the current needs of the public, not all agree that this aligns with the fundamental goals of science. Supporters of science for pure truth and epistemological value believe that the pursuit of truth should be done by people who are insiders and have working knowledge on the topic. Typically, this rests on the Value-Free ideal of science, which is that scientific activity is completely independent of non-epistemic values, including social context (Douglas, 2009). The issue with this line of argument is that several examples show that scientific progress typically results in some practical benefit, even if the initial purpose was merely for curiosity or knowledge development. As an example, research to develop new image processing techniques for astronomy and better connection between telescopes led to major improvements in Wi-Fi and technology for medicine instrumentation (International Astronomical Union, 2019). It is very unlikely that the full range of consequences a scientific development will have in society is known right away, as some of these improvements happen over decades. Therefore, it is unrealistic to categorize practices as being for pure truth or pure utility, as those are intertwined, and even the most unrelated topic could turn out to have major impacts for society.

While it is true that the full extent of consequences is not clear to scientists at first, the same can be said for the general public, and so the previous argument doesn’t determine one contribution as more valid than the other. Authors such as Owen, Macnaghten and Stilgoe point out another result of public participation in priority setting in science that goes beyond this ignorance of future outcomes. They analyse documentation of different approaches to social inclusion in the process of science and find that a lot of those mention that resources should be allocated towards projects that have the “right impacts”. However, they conclude that the “negotiation of the ‘right impacts’ of science and innovation is inherently a political discussion, involving considerations of power, democracy and values”  (Owen, Macnaghten, & Stilgoe, 2012). Therefore, this concept is deeply anchored in the current set of values of the community involved and can be criticized, in their eyes, on the grounds that it emphasizes input from influential sectors of the external community with little questioning of their values and intentions.

There are clear examples in which the interaction of politics and social factors with science has led to scandals of pseudoscience and occurrences of doubtful ethical consequences. One of such famous examples is the Lysenko affair which lasted from the 1930s to the 1960s (Roll-Hansen, 2005). According to Roll-Hansen, this was “a classic example of how politics can corrupt and undermine its (science’s) rational basis”. In the case of Lysenko, a rising peasant in Stalin’s Soviet Union, his controversial work in genetics could not be questioned by expert scientists, as they were barred and he was left standing with no one to defy his claims. This illustrates how the influence of political context in scientific research can detriment the quality of that research. Authors such as Merton argue that science needs to operate autonomously, with no input from external factors, as the “ethos” of science should autocorrect and shape the way science evolves (Merton, 1942). He claims in The Normative Structure of Science that “scientists are recruited from the ranks of those who exhibit an unusual degree of moral integrity”. When scientists are assumed to be agents on a higher moral ground, it becomes easy to infer they should be left alone to decide on the future of science. Today, political interference with science is not as obvious as it has been in the past, but it still exists in more indirect forms of control, delegation of power and funding priorities.

IV. Portrayal of Scientists as Part of the Community

The caveat in this argument is in the assumption that scientists, unlike the general population are not affected by the surrounding context of their time and will decide only in the name of pure knowledge and curiosity. While it might be true that people who become scientists have a higher degree of curiosity, that doesn’t give them immunity from being influenced by social pressures, political powers and other personal factors. In the example given above, of the Lysenko affair, it was in fact the group of scientists in the field of genetics that was influenced by the political decisions and beliefs of the time. Most of the opposition to the participation of the general public in the process of science is on the grounds that individual opinions and values would have a major role in determining scientific activity. However, we have established through examples that scientists are just one more group of this community which is also affected by external components. 

Given there is no intrinsic difference in moral capacity and value between scientists and the general public, the latter should be included in the decision-making process that leads to scientific developments. The question becomes how do we cancel out those individual biases with the goal of producing science that benefits or agrees with a variety of groups? An interesting approach could be that of collective intelligence. Proponents of this idea describe collective intelligence as ranging from the “awareness and consciousness to models of collective action” by a large group of people (Peters & Heraud, 2015). This idea is more practically implemented in methods like Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), which is described as a “transparent, interactive process by which societal actors [..] become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process.” (Davis & Laas, 2014). The new challenge is to properly balance the input from social agents into shaping a scientific process that is more responsive to the public’s demand and values but still make sure high-quality science is produced. As a consequence, attempts to open up the stage and broaden the sources of input in the decisions of science policy is a valid and arguably even necessary step to take.

V. Conclusion

The perception we have of science has changed over the years just as much as science has changed itself. From a purely intellectual activity to one of the major sources of interest and investment today, the interaction of science with the general public has been in constant transition. Today, with the development of fields such as biomedicine, genetics and even astrophysics, the debate of priority setting has become critical. As an activity with direct and indirect consequences to the daily life of all citizens, it was argued that the choice of projects and directions in science research requires the participation of external agents. Concerns about which values are being implemented into science are extremely valid, but they should not lead to the complete separation of science from the public, rather it should motivate more research and thought into how to merge these two communities. While not all can be left in the public’s hand, the attempt to isolate scientific decisions from social pressures and political movements is in vain, as scientists are involved in these very movements, so prioritizing their voice is just a form of favoritism of one group over others. Collective efforts and approaches to integrating more responsiveness in scientific activity were proposed as a starting point for the change needed. The limitation of this argument is that it replaces individual biases for the collective values of a community, so making sure all voices are accounted for becomes a central issue.

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